UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORKx DARKPULSE, INC., Plaintiff, v. FIRSTFIRE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND, LLC, et al, Defendant.	21 CV 11222 Injunction
DARKPULSE, INC., Plaintiff, v. FIRSTFIRE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND, LLC, et al, Defendant.	
Plaintiff, v. FIRSTFIRE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND, LLC, et al, Defendant.	
v. FIRSTFIRE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND, LLC, et al, Defendant.	
FIRSTFIRE GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND, LLC, et al, Defendant.	
FUND, LLC, et al, Defendant.	Injunction
x	
	New York, N.Y. January 21, 2022 2:00 p.m.
Before:	
HON. EDGARDO R	RAMOS,
	District Judge
APPEARANCE	ES
THE BASILE LAW FIRM P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: GUSTAVE P. PASSANANTE ERIC BENZENBERG KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Attorneys for Defendants BY: AARON H. MARKS TRACY LIN JULIA DEVEREUX HARPER	

24

25

1 (Case called) 2 DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for the 3 record. 4 MR. PASSANANTE: Gustave Passanante for the plaintiff. 5 MR. BENZENBERG: Eric Benzenberg, your Honor, the 6 Basile Law Firm. 7 MR. MARKS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Aaron Marks, 8 Tracy Lin, and Julia Harper from Kirkland Ellis, for the 9 defendants. 10 THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all. 11 This matters is on for a preliminary injunction 12 hearing. I have received the parties' papers, and I'm ready to 13 hear you. If you speak from the table, you don't have to 14 stand. If you want to use the podium, if that makes you more comfortable, you can use the podium. Just please bring the 15 microphone as close to you as possible. 16 17 And Mr. Passanante or Mr. Benzenberg? 18 MR. PASSANANTE: It will be Mr. Passanante, your 19 Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. PASSANANTE: So, your Honor, this case is about an 22 unregistered dealer engaging in the business's security 23 transactions.

the defendants made to the amendment of the note and the

The first point I want to make is the objections that

venue -- forum selection clause. The plaintiff's asserting that since the -- on the face of the note, it's criminally usurious based on the stated interest rate, the original issued discount, as well as the commitment shares issue. It brings in over the usury limitation of 25 percent in the State of New York, deeming the note criminally usurious.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Can you slow down, please?
MR. PASSANANTE: Yes.

THE COURT: And I apologize. We all have to wear masks, but if you speak up a little bit, slow down, speak up a little bit, bring the microphone closer.

MR. PASSANANTE: So because of the stated interest in the note as well as the origination discount and the commitment shares that were issued — the value of which, by the way, were approximately \$1.4 million — that easily exceeds the 25 percent interest cap that the State of New York provides for in the penal law, deemed the note criminally usurious and void ab initio. Since that note is void ab initio, that would mean that all ancillary documents, as far as the amendment goes, as well as the forum selection clause, would also be void.

THE COURT: When did you determine that this was usurious?

MR. PASSANANTE: You can tell by the terms of the note, your Honor, because of the stated interest rate and the original issue discount, which is about -- around 10 percent of

the principal. However, when you analyze, it actually increases to 15 percent because the nine-month maturity on the note as well as the commitment shares were issued.

THE COURT: So it was usurious at the time it was entered into?

MR. PASSANANTE: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And why didn't your client know that?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, your Honor, my client is not an attorney, and it's an emerging growth corporation. They are traded on OTC markets. They are typically desperate for capital infusions, especially at the stage that they're in.

THE COURT: Did your client have a lawyer?

MR. PASSANANTE: Excuse me?

THE COURT: Did your client have a lawyer?

MR. PASSANANTE: Not sure, your Honor. I'm only litigation counsel.

THE COURT: What?

MR. PASSANANTE: You're saying at the time they entered the transaction?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PASSANANTE: Did they have an attorney? They had general counsel. As far as determining the usurious nature, though, I don't think that was a concern -- a concern for them at the time, because they were desperate for capital. And since they -- since the defendant was willing to provide

capital, they were more interested in doing that. And then when the client determined that how --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You really have to slow down.

MR. PASSANANTE: I'm sorry.

Once my client was able to determine how offensive some of the provisions in the note, were was when they sought counsel to determine the lawfulness of the note, which then when we reviewed it, determined that it was usurious as well as the other potential violations that defendants engaged in.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. So when, exactly, did your client determine that it was usurious?

MR. PASSANANTE: Your Honor, I don't think my client determined that it was usurious. I think counsel determined it was usurious, litigation counsel.

THE COURT: When?

MR. PASSANANTE: When? When we were able to review the note. The reason it wasn't inserted in our opening brief, your Honor, because — the point that you posed to me — is that corporations can't assert usury as an affirmative claim, so we can only raise it as a defense. The corporation can only raise it as a defense. So it's really just in response to defendant's argument as to the forum selection clause.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: So that's why it wasn't raised until now, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, how long has your client been around? 1 MR. PASSANANTE: How long have they been around? 2 3 THE COURT: DarkPulse. 4 MR. PASSANANTE: As a publicly traded company? 5 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 MR. PASSANANTE: Three years, but there were private 7 before that for about seven. THE COURT: I know they engaged in a similar 8 9 transaction with FirstFire in 2018, correct? 10 MR. PASSANANTE: Correct. 11 THE COURT: Were they desperate for cash then? 12 MR. PASSANANTE: Yes, they were, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Have they been desperate for cash since or 14 throughout? 15 MR. PASSANANTE: Yes, your Honor. So they're a tech 16 company. 17 THE COURT: What do they do? 18 MR. PASSANANTE: They -- they create software or 19 hardware, rather, called BODTA, brillouin optical -- optilian, 20 something, something, technology. Essentially, what it does is 21 it produces a dark pulse sensor, which can be inserted in 22 mines, and what it will do is it will send out a dark pulse to 23 read for any weaknesses in structures, any cracks in pipes, or 24 anything like that. So they try and sell their software -- or 25 hardware, rather, to mines, gold mines, oil mines, and things

1	like that. That's where their technology is used.
2	THE COURT: And there's at least two with FirstFire,
3	correct?
4	MR. PASSANANTE: Correct.
5	THE COURT: And they have engaged in similar
6	transactions with other entities, correct?
7	MR. PASSANANTE: They have, your Honor.
8	THE COURT: How many more?
9	MR. PASSANANTE: I think it's approximately 12.
10	THE COURT: Approximately 12?
11	MR. PASSANANTE: Yeah.
12	THE COURT: And I think you've brought at least one
13	other lawsuit here, correct?
14	MR. PASSANANTE: We're in litigation DarkPulse is
15	in litigation in Southern District. I think they're a
16	defendant in the Southern District, but they're a plaintiff in
17	the Eastern District.
18	THE COURT: Don't you have a case before
19	Judge Schofield?
20	MR. PASSANANTE: Yes, your Honor. In front of
21	Judge Schofield as well. You're right.
22	THE COURT: And then you're engaged in other
23	litigations?
24	MR. PASSANANTE: Yeah.
25	THE COURT: When did these litigations begin?

25

1 MR. PASSANANTE: Roughly around the same time, your Honor, within the last couple of months. 2 3 MR. BENZENBERG: The Carebourn litigation, your Honor, 4 is the earliest. It started approximately one year ago now. 5 THE COURT: One year ago? 6 MR. BENZENBERG: Yes. 7 THE COURT: And did you bring the same causes of 8 action in that litigation as this one? 9 MR. BENZENBERG: No. Carebourn brought that action in 10 the State Court of Minnesota, and we've been there since -we've been asserting defenses in that case, and we're currently 11 12 in discovery as of the moment. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So you needed cash, and so you 14 entered into a number of these transactions with entities like 15 FirstFire, et cetera. Now, these are all multimillion dollar 16 transactions, correct? 17 MR. PASSANANTE: Not always, your Honor. For example, 18 I think the first note with FirstFire was roughly \$250,000. THE COURT: With FirstFire? 19 20 MR. PASSANANTE: Yes. The September 2018 note. 21 was for roughly around that much. I am not sure if, actually, 22 any of them are over a million. I think they're generally a 23 couple hundred thousand dollars in principal. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. PASSANANTE: Okay. And so to move on to the

elements to meet for a preliminary injunction, your Honor, the plaintiff believes that they're likely to succeed on the merits based on only the transactions available on EDGAR, which are public documents — public record.

And I note that plaintiff understands that those are only disclosures regarding the purchase of notes; however, they — plaintiff did make the allegations as to the selling activity of the defendants, as also evidenced in their affidavits that they provided in support of their opposition, so —

THE COURT: What am I to make of the fact they have been converting your stock?

MR. PASSANANTE: Excuse me?

THE COURT: What am I to make of the pattern, if any, in terms of their conversion of your stock?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, your Honor, if a person is in the business -- engages in the business of buying and selling securities, they are deemed a dealer under the Exchange Act, under section 3(a)(5). Generally, when you're in the business of buying and selling securities, it means that you're engaged in more than just a few isolated transactions.

What we do know is that the defendants in this action had engaged in dozens and dozens of these transactions, that we can tell, as of disclosures on EDGAR made by other issuers.

And just in our cases, we do know that they engaged in the

conversion of that debt into stock, and then do sell that common stock into the market.

So all of those securities transactions are certainly more than a few isolated transactions, and we believe in discovery, we would be able to obtain the selling records from the brokers of the defendants.

THE COURT: Isn't that published information.

MR. PASSANANTE: No, your Honor. Not selling records.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: But the disclosures, of course, are public record, which, while it does evidence a lot of transactions, it could also be missing transactions because, remember, those disclosures are on behalf of the issuers, so some issuers don't make proper disclosures. So in discovery, there's likely to -- we're likely to find even more transactions that are evidenced on EDGAR.

THE COURT: What do you mean some issuers don't make proper disclosures?

MR. PASSANANTE: So some public companies, they might not disclose necessarily the entity name. They might be not reporting under the Exchange Act, which would — obviously, they'd suffer consequences from the SEC and from the markets themselves, and could suffer a delisting. But it's not uncommon for — especially if a company trades on the OTC markets, to file either incomplete disclosures or just not file

disclosures at all and not make proper -- not meet the proper reporting requirements.

THE COURT: So you're asking me to speculate that FirstFire may have improperly failed to disclose certain of its transactions?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, no, your Honor. So FirstFire wouldn't be the company disclosing it. It would be the issuer. So, for example, let's say there's ABC Corp., and FirstFire has a note with ABC Corp. and ABC Corp. is a publicly traded company.

THE COURT: Slow down.

MR. PASSANANTE: Sorry.

ABC Corp. would then be required to file in the disclosure -- whether it being 8-K or a 10-Q or a 10-K, stating the transaction that it entered into was FirstFire. So we wouldn't find the disclosures by FirstFire. We'd -- it would be evidenced by disclosure of other companies traded on the OTC markets, which are subject to those reporting requirements by the SEC. And so I'm not asking you to speculate, as I think that there's plenty of evidence on EDGAR as of today. We attached the transaction list from all the evidence that we found regarding transactions with FirstFire as an exhibit to the complaint.

THE COURT: Sorry. Ms. Rivera, can you close the curtains so we don't blind Mr. Benzenberg, please?

MR. BENZENBERG: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. PASSANANTE: So, your Honor, back to my point.

I'm not asking the Court to speculate that FirstFire is engaged in these transactions.

THE COURT: But you're suggesting that there may be some wrongdoing somewhere along the line?

MR. PASSANANTE: Not necessarily wrongdoing. What I'm trying to purport is that there could potentially be even more transactions out there that are not public record.

THE COURT: Well, what's wrong with the transactions that they've engaged in that we know about?

MR. PASSANANTE: So the transactions that they've engaged in are securities transactions themselves. So the purchase of the note — the note's defined as a security under the Exchange Act. So the securities purchase agreement sets forth the terms for the parties — for FirstFire in this case — to purchase the note from DarkPulse. So that agreement itself is a securities transaction, so that's why the plaintiff takes the position that the agreement itself — in this case, the note, which is sold through the securities purchase agreement — is itself, indeed, a securities transaction.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: Right? On top of that, the -there's significant evidence in our case already that FirstFire

acts as an underwriter, because they acquire the securities with an intent to redistribute. They make profits off of the markups because they acquire the securities at a substantial discount to market and then quickly sell after the conversion; that conversion either being a market-adjustable discount to conversion or being a fixed discount, which would still leave them in the money, so to say, similar to an option contract. So they're still acquiring stock at a discount to market, and then they will quickly resell that stock into the market to reap the benefit of the markup.

THE COURT: Can I just ask you a question? Putting aside whether or not this initial agreement is legal or not, is what you just described allowed for under the agreement?

MR. PASSANANTE: Is it allowed for under the agreement? Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PASSANANTE: Okay. And just to bring to the Court's attention there are two cases that were decided in the Southern District that were mentioned in our papers; the LG and the Vystar cases.

THE COURT: The LG and the Vystar?

MR. PASSANANTE: *Vystar*, yeah. Those were two Southern District cases that focused on the performance under the agreements.

While sometimes that may be a proper analysis for a

court to engage in for a section 15(a) violation; in this case, it isn't, only because, as we stated before, the acquisition of the note itself from the defendant is, indeed, a securities transaction, as opposed to, for example, the cases that defendants cite in their brief, the *Frati* and the *Foundation*Venture cases. Those were service agreements that contemplated further securities transactions.

THE COURT: But in the LG and Vystar, was the same argument made?

MR. PASSANANTE: No, your Honor. So the argument made in those cases were that the agreements were unlawful because of the performance due under the agreements, which would further — be further security transactions by an unregistered dealer. For some reason the court —

THE COURT: Is that what you're saying?

MR. PASSANANTE: No, your Honor. So under section 29(b), it voids all agreements as made in violation under the Exchange Act. And so like I was saying earlier, these convertible notes are purchased through a securities purchase agreement. That securities purchase agreement itself is a transaction in securities. So the position the plaintiff is taking is that the initial transaction — the acquisition of that note by the defendant — is in fact, a securities transaction, which is why the entire note would be void.

THE COURT: Okay.

MILGDAR

MR. PASSANANTE: Okay. And as a public securities issuer, DarkPulse is within the class of persons that the act was designed to protect. And to touch on the --

THE COURT: What is the class of persons the act is designed to protect? How is it defined in that section?

MR. PASSANANTE: Since DarkPulse is an issuer of securities, the act is designed to protect issuers of securities, especially with the dealer registration requirement because of the restrictions and disclosure requirements it imposes on broker dealers.

To touch on the unwilling or innocent party argument that defendants brought up in their brief, I just wanted to clarify that that applies only to violaters of the act. And for a person to be an unwilling or innocent party, they would have to assist in the violation of the act.

DarkPulse didn't assist in -- assist in the defendants engaging in securities transactions and buying and selling securities as a part of their business. So since DarkPulse didn't assist in that violation --

THE COURT: I guess I don't understand that argument.

This is a bilateral agreement, and to the extent that DarkPulse was desperate for cash, why can't that be seen as assisting in this transaction?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, I wouldn't take that position, your Honor. I wouldn't take that position because they, for

example, in the Buffalo Forge case, there was --

THE COURT: The Buffalo?

MR. PASSANANTE: Buffalo Forge case. That party was essentially on both sides of the transaction, assisting in deals and finding other agreements, which would be -- and then they attempted to terminate the note -- or I'm sorry, void the transaction. Since they were assisting in it, then they would be considered unwilling or innocent party -- I'm sorry, not considered, because of the activity that they were engaging in, because they were assisting in the violations of the act.

Moving on to the irreparable harm argument. It's been demonstrated that excessive selling activity and the erosion of the stock price is irreparable because it would affect the economic viability of a company. It's something that's not remedial by money damages. You can't restore market confidence, you can't restore certain —

THE COURT: Why would market confidence be damaged by FirstFire converting its debt? As I understand it, from defendant's papers, while their stake in DarkPulse may not be insignificant, it is small. And as they tell it, even when they're trading on a daily basis, the stock that they traded is a small percentage of the overall stock that's traded on any given day.

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, your Honor, yeah, that was in the affidavit that the defendants brought in support of its

papers. However, they do still write currently — as long as the affidavit was accurate, over 90 million shares of the DarkPulse stock. So if they were to dump, let's say, all of that stock in one day, that would probably amount to a volume significantly more than their average trading volume.

THE COURT: If they were to do that.

MR. PASSANANTE: If they were to do that.

THE COURT: Why would they do that?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, your Honor, since they converted at such a substantial discount to market, they would still technically profit from any sales regardless of how much the stock price does decline.

THE COURT: Isn't it in their interest for your stock to be as valuable as possible?

MR. PASSANANTE: It is, your Honor. But there's no -since they did acquire it at such a steep discount, it's not
like they would make no money -- of course, they would make
less money, as you're suggesting, but they do have the
opportunity to do that, and the opportunity to do that alone
would -- if they were to put those many sell orders on a stock
trade at this volume, then it would --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, because we're not exactly working on a blank slate here, right? There's a prior agreement. And we didn't see FirstFire engage in that type of reckless trading that you're suggesting might happen

here, right? They converted that stock over a period of months or maybe even a couple years. So why are you asking me now to assume that they're going to dump all this stock precipitously, and damages — and even assuming that creates larger than a ripple, given the amount of stock that your company trades on any given day?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, certainly, your Honor. The reason why this got brought to our attention is because on January 14th -- I think it was last Friday when plaintiff originally filed its order to show cause for temporary restraining order -- we got notified from our client that there was a massive sell order for DarkPulse stock, and the defendant was one of the only parties that had the ability to put in an order that large, which was why the plaintiff took the position that they might do this again, that the defendants might put in a significant sell order again that could potentially damage the shares.

THE COURT: Was that part of the papers you put in last week?

MR. PASSANANTE: It was part of the first affidavit by Dennis O'Leary.

THE COURT: Did FirstFire put in a massive sell order on that day?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, FirstFire rebutted that with an affidavit from Eli Firearm, which stated how many shares that

that they sold. But the reason that the plaintiff originally believed it was the defendants was because of the sell order that the O'Leary affidavit speaks about. I believe it was January 14th.

THE COURT: Have you confirmed it was them?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, your Honor, we were discussing before, we can't see the parties. It's not public information, who is selling and buying.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: You can just see the volume.

THE COURT: By the way, can I ask another question?

Generally speaking, when a party comes to court to request a

TRO or preliminary injunction, the party is required to state

that no similar application has been made before, and you

didn't. I assume there's not. But I learned, I guess from the

defense, that they had actually started an action in Delaware a

couple weeks before you brought your action. That was not

mentioned in your papers. Should it have been?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, your Honor, so since the plaintiff takes the position that the agreements are void ab initio, the Delaware action, according to the plaintiff's position, was improper. That's why the plaintiffs didn't feel the need to mention the Delaware action, because it takes the position that it was improper.

THE COURT: So it doesn't exist?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, no, not that it doesn't exist, your Honor. It was just that we felt — the plaintiff felt that jurisdiction was improper here because of the usurious nature of the contract, and that amendment would be void. And the same argument is most likely going to be made in the Delaware action. And the Delaware action also was only seeking a declaratory judgment; it wasn't to enforce the terms of the note.

THE COURT: No. Well, I mean, tomayto, tomahto.

Again, as I said, it's not that you were required under the rule to tell me about that action. My only question is should you have. Would that have then contributed to the quantum of information that would have assisted me in analyzing your papers? But go ahead.

MR. PASSANANTE: I apologize, your Honor. Maybe we should have.

As to the balance of hardships between the parties, the relief that the defendants could potentially be entitled to is certainly calculable, which, during the pendency of this action, they wouldn't suffer any harm if they were to be prevented from selling any DarkPulse stock on the market because if, let's say, the market conditions increased, that would be calculated into damages and they missed an opportunity to sell that stock at a certain time, then it would be easily quantifiable, and they could obtain a money judgment against

the plaintiff if they were to be successful on the merits of this action.

Lastly, your Honor, of course the plaintiff is willing to post a bond in the amount of whatever the Court would request, pending the disposition of this action.

And that's all I have to say, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. Thank you.

Mr. Marks, will you be arguing on behalf of FirstFire?

MR. MARKS: I will. I just want to make sure you can hear me.

THE COURT: I can hear you.

MR. MARKS: Okay. Thank you.

Your Honor, as set out in our papers, we believe there are several reasons why DarkPulse's motion for preliminary injunction should be denied. As your Honor pointed out in the first instance, we believe that this motion and DarkPulse's claims related to the April 2021 note do not belong before this Court.

We agreed in an amendment to the note that the exclusive forum provision would be for the state and federal courts in Delaware. This dispute first arose in November when FirstFire converted the note to shares, the parties went back and forth after DarkPulse requested two-thirds of the share's back. And on December 13th, we filed a declaratory action in the chancellery court of Delaware, seeking a judgment that the

conversion was proper and that FirstFire is entitled to keep all of the shares it converted.

DarkPulse, through Delaware counsel, has entered an appearance there, and we have a scheduling order in place now for briefing on initial dispositive motions.

THE COURT: They haven't answered?

MR. MARKS: What's that?

THE COURT: They didn't answer?

MR. MARKS: Not yet. Their answer is not due yet.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARKS: DarkPulse provides no viable reason for nullifying the forum selection clause agreed upon in the amendment and why the claims concerning the April 2021 note should be heard by this Court.

First, in their complaint, DarkPulse suggested that the amendment's contents were not explained to their CEO by my client before DarkPulse, the CEO, executed the amendment.

That, of course, is not an excuse for a sophisticated party to void a contract or a contractual provision.

THE COURT: But wasn't there some suggestion in I think your paper that, in fact, Mr. O'Leary, if that's his name, did consult with counsel?

MR. MARKS: He did. He did. So, yes, it's our contention that the amendment should obviously be enforced; that Mr. O'Leary consulted with counsel; that Mr. O'Leary, as

the CEO of DarkPulse, was more than capable of understanding the one-page amendment that only really spoke to the governing law provision and the choice of forum provision. So we think --

THE COURT: So the amendment spoke not only to forum but also to the choice of law?

MR. MARKS: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARKS: In their papers, for the first time last night, DarkPulse now claims that the note was criminally usurious, and that somehow that is a basis for voiding the forum selection clause. There are several layers of reasons why this argument is completely unsound.

First of all what they don't address, again, is that Delaware law applies here and not New York law, not New York usury statutes. In fact, Judge Buchwald, in a similar case, EMA Financial v. NFusz, 444 F.Supp.3d 530, spoke to whether the parties agreed-upon choice of law — in that case it was Nevada — should be ignored because of the New York usury statute, and Judge Buchwald found that the public policy behind the New York usury statute was not fundamental to warrant overriding the parties' choice of law in order to ensure the usury statute's enforcement. Judge Buchwald could not conclude that enforcing the parties' choice of law provision would be truly obnoxious to New York public policy.

So they state no reason why we should even look to the New York's usury statute in assessing the choice of forum provision. However, even if they could state a reason from looking at the New York usury statute, it really does not matter because, here, it is obvious that even if the New York statute applied, it is plain that the note at issue here is not criminally usurious. On its face, this note has a 10 percent interest rate, it has a 10 percent OID, original issue discount, even annualized — DarkPulse acknowledges in their papers last night that, on its face, the interest rate and the OID adds up to less than 25 percent, which is the limit.

THE COURT: As I understand it, it's a fixed rate in connection with this agreement?

MR. MARKS: Correct, your Honor. Correct. So I think what you're referring to is the conversion mechanism, and that is a fixed rate, and there is good reason why one does not then account for the conversion rate in figuring out whether the instrument is usurious or not.

And, in fact, DarkPulse did not even suggest that the conversion mechanism here goes into the calculation of usury. What they did suggest, just before when Mr. Passanante was arguing — what they did suggest was that on top of the interest rate and the original issue discount, that this Court should also add value that of the shares that were reserved for conversion at the time of entering the note to determine usury.

Okay?

When the note was entered in April 2021, the company reserved, whatever it was, 177 million or more shares in the event that six months or more later there would be a conversion. They're suggesting that in determining usury, that these shares, which may never be touched, should be taken into the calculation of whether something is usurious. That is flatly wrong, and your Honor actually rejected that very same argument in a 2019 decision that your Honor wrote in the case EMA Financial v. AIM Exploration.

Your Honor cited several Southern District decisions that held, "The reservation of shares is not an independent payment to the lender, but merely a mechanism by which to effectuate the share conversion as envisioned by the note and the SPA. Since the share conversion feature does not render the agreement usurious, neither does the reservation of shares provision." And you can conclude in that decision, did hear the note, did not require the share reserve to be paid to the plaintiff. It was simply security that the defendants were required to set aside so that there would be shares available if the conversion option was exercised.

THE COURT: So is it the case, Mr. Marks, that if the reserve shares are counted, it may be usurious, but if they're not counted, they are not usurious?

MR. MARKS: That's correct. Meaning that what they

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

you can tell me?

did in their papers from last night, as you'll see, they value their reserve shares at the time that we contracted, right, you know, however 177 million shares were worth \$1.4 million on April 21 -- or April 26 when we entered this contract, and they're saying you add that to your calculation, and that puts you over the usury line. Okay? But there's no decision, yours or the several decisions cited in the Southern District, that you cite that would require that. In fact, they all reject it. So this argument that this note was usurious, and then for that to be a reason to void the forum selection clause is completely speechless. There's no basis for it whatsoever. So, your Honor, the motion should be denied outright for being brought in the wrong forum. THE COURT: Can I ask you a question about that note, Mr. Marks? MR. MARKS: Sure. THE COURT: My understanding is that there is a New York Court of Appeals decision from last fall. MR. MARKS: Yes. Which essentially, I think, tells us that THE COURT: we all, here in the Southern District, got it wrong. MR. MARKS: Yes. THE COURT: Was that the reason for the amendment; if

MR. MARKS: Your Honor, the timing -- look, I was not

involved with the amendment. Timing would suggest that there's a connection there; however, something that's important to understand is that that decision, the *Ader Bays* decision by the Court of Appeals, really has no application to this note, and that's because of the following:

What the Ader Bays decision determined was that if a note had a variable or floating conversion rate, meaning that at the time of conversion, six months, eight months after the note is entered, let's say the stock has gone up or the stock has gone down — the way that a variable or floating rate conversion note works is that, let's say there's \$100,000 in outstanding balance, the way the conversion would work under a variable rate note, which is typical, is you'd be able to convert at the then-market rate at the time of conversion, minus like a 30 or 35 percent discount. That's typical for one of these notes.

And what the Ader Bays court, what the Court of Appeals said, is that if the noteholder is guaranteed a discount off-of-the-market rate, they are not subject really to market risk of the stock, meaning if the stock goes down here from April to November when we converted, under a variable rate note, our conversion price would drop with the market and go 30 percent lower so that it would never be in trouble. Okay?

Our note is different because we don't have a variable rate. We don't have a variable rate conversion rate. We have

a fixed conversion rate here, meaning we agreed that on April 26th, our conversion rate, under normal circumstances, would be 15 cents or .15 cents, whatever it is, per share. And it was going to stay that regardless. It was fixed. So if the stock went down significantly and the company tanked, our conversion rate stayed the same. We weren't entitled to convert to a lower number with the market and a discount from there.

What Ader Bays said is this variable rate or floating rate note, notwithstanding the fact it might be tough to calculate what that's worth, but that should be added to a calculation for usury. They distinguished that from this note, right, which is a fixed rate note. So the Ader Bays decision is really inapplicable to this case.

Now, you asked did we get the amendment because of the Ader Bays decision. The timing, I agree, was very close in time, but the Ader Bays decision really has nothing to do with this case. Okay?

So for the reasons I just stated, we believe strongly that the motion should be denied because it was brought in the wrong forum. Delaware is the proper place.

As to if your Honor reaches the preliminary injunction motion itself, we think that on the merits of it, it also would have to be denied as it fails every single prong.

First, they don't come close to satisfying the

requirement of irreparable harm here. DarkPulse asserts that it will be irreparably harmed if we sell into the market. What was 177 million shares is now half of that. First of all, you know, obviously, they were late in bringing this motion.

Seven weeks and 42 trading days past. Whatever urgency they had, whatever they saw in the market that they thought we were doing something, we weren't. And whatever urgency they suggest there was from 177 million shares, obviously, is at least half of that now.

First, and obviously, we're talking about shares of stock here. DarkPulse common shares are heavily traded in the open market. Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday of this week alone, 260 million shares of DarkPulse traded. 85 million shares a day this week. And my client has little, if any, of that.

THE COURT: But there's something, isn't there,

Mr. Marks, to the point that if you were to dump the balance of
the DarkPulse shares that you have on Monday, notwithstanding
the fact that there are however many billion shares outstanding
in circulation, that might have a negative impact on it,
wouldn't it?

MR. MARKS: Your Honor, at this point it's less than 2 percent of the DarkPulse shares out there. It's less than what was traded on each of the three days this week. It's totally speculative as to what impact our selling would have.

THE COURT: I take it that the 85 million shares that

were sold on average over the last three days were multiples of different traders, correct, or different holders?

MR. MARKS: I mean, that's not public information.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARKS: And let me add this: It may or may not be because last month in December, DarkPulse struck another deal with a different financing source, right, where they gave — this is a firm GHS. We mentioned this in our papers. They offered to GHS 300 million new shares. Okay? So GHS is unlikely holding onto these shares. GHS is likely a party that is out there selling their shares. There are no restrictions on them whatsoever.

THE COURT: What are the terms of that agreement; if you know?

MR. MARKS: It's a finance agreement. It's not a convertible note. It's a different type of instrument.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARKS: But the point is that they're looking to limit us from selling 85 million shares. They just gave another investor completely uninhibited 300 million shares, and they're not asking that entity to slow down their trade.

Your Honor, again, that where an injunction is sought regarding common shares of stock, and such shares are available on the open market, there is no reason why monetary damages would not adequately compensate the plaintiff if it proved up

its case.

This notion, as we just talked about, about dilution -- again, I understand it's a hypothetical that if somebody trades a lot of shares in one day, but DarkPulse has done nothing to quantify that, to suggest that a sale of 80 or 90 million shares, which my client has not done -- you know, to date, we've only sold in small pieces -- that that would make up less than 2 percent of the market, where this company has issued 300 million to somebody else last month, where they've issued 3.5 billion shares to convertible noteholders over the past three years, 3.5 billion shares -- that this 80 or 90 million shares is somehow going to make some sort of difference here. It just doesn't make sense.

THE COURT: How many different holders did they issue up to?

MR. MARKS: I think it's in our papers that they have done 20 different notes, they've done 36 conversions. I think it's seven or eight different investment funds that they've converted with. And it's been massive amounts of shares.

THE COURT: So 3.5 billion over 20 different notes?

MR. MARKS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARKS: Right. So I mean, again, there's now 5, 5 and a half billion shares out there. Three and a half billion of them are issued to the investment funds that they've done

these deals with.

So, your Honor, there's no irreparable harm here. I can quickly address likelihood of success on merits if you'd like me to.

THE COURT: Is your client an unregistered securities dealer?

MR. MARKS: They are not a dealer, they are not registered, but they are not in the business of buying and selling securities as defined under the Securities and Exchange Act. You know, first, there are several prongs of 29(b) that are in no way satisfied here. First, the note issue is not an unlawful transaction under the securities law.

THE COURT: Is it a security?

MR. MARKS: It's not a security at all. It's funny that when they're claiming that it's usurious, DarkPulse characterizes the note as a loan; when not discussing usury, it's now somehow a security. It's not a security.

And Judge Carter's decision in *Vystar* is really squarely on point. Judge Carter then granted summary judgment in favor of EMA Financial on plaintiff's 29(b) claims because nothing in the note or the SPA explicitly required EMA Financial, the noteholder, to act as a broker-dealer. The note was capable of being performed, even if EMA or, here, FirstFire, did not register as a dealer.

FirstFire is not required under the note to sell or

buy securities. Notes were neither made nor performed in violation of any federal securities laws required for decision under section 29(b).

Judge Carter dismissed the Vystar's 29(b) filing on this basis. He also, by the way, found that rule 15(a)(1) provides no private right of action. Those are two reasons right there in Judge Carter's opinion why there's no likelihood of success on the merits.

But there are more reasons. Your Honor just asked about the business of buying and selling securities. DarkPulse would have to prove under 29(b) that FirstFire is irregularly engaged in the business of buying and selling securities as a dealer. There is no basis for suggesting that the trader exception that is built into this determination of whether an entity would be a dealer, the exception for being a trader trading on its own account; this exemption should apply to FirstFire.

As far as whether they're in the regular business of buying and selling securities, one example proving otherwise, comes from DarkPulse's own complaint. DarkPulse has alleged that out of \$34 million in principal, right, loaned by FirstFire for all of its convertible notes that DarkPulse found on EDGAR, FirstFire converted only on \$1.4 million of that known amount, or 4 percent of the total amount loaned.

So with respect to the other \$32.6 million of loans

made, those were all paid back by the companies they loaned to in cash, right? They were straight up loan-type transactions. The six months passed or however many months passed. Rather than converting for shares, the companies paid back, there was \$700,000 in cash, plus the interest. There was no securities involved whatsoever.

DarkPulse also said in their papers that FirstFire effectuated no fewer than 203 securities transactions with other small companies like DarkPulse; yet the EDGAR list shows only about 30 conversions and 13 share issuances.

DarkPulse does not have a reasonable likelihood based on this data of demonstrating that FirstFire is in the business of buying and selling securities, which is a plain requirement obviously for 29(b).

Last element here: DarkPulse will not be able to show that it is in the class of entities intend to be protected by the Exchange Act. As set out in our brief, precedent requires a party to be an unwilling and innocent party to a transaction that purportedly violated 29(b).

Here, based on DarkPulse's track record of entering dozens of these convertible notes, based on the fact that this note, in particular, acknowledged that FirstFire was not a registered dealer; the fact there's a covenant in the SPA that DarkPulse would never assert before any person or governmental authority that it was entitled to relief based on the fact that

FirstFire was an unregistered dealer; the fact that DarkPulse is and was plaintiff in lawsuits seeking to void contracts with investment funds like this that were not registered before it entered into this note --

THE COURT: Sorry. What are the dates of those actions that you're referring to?

MR. MARKS: So Mr. Benzenberg referred to the Carebourn action. For example, that action was brought by Carebourne in advance of -- you know, over a year ago.

Carebourne is the plaintiff there pursuing the shares. It didn't receive the shares. They didn't convert. DarkPulse prevented them from converting. And DarkPulse is defending that action saying that Carebourn was an unregistered dealer, and that predates this note.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARKS: Okay? All these things point to overwhelmingly that DarkPulse was no babe in the woods when it came to this dealer issue. They were well aware.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: The counsel for DarkPulse says that this was a company that was continually desperate for money, desperate for cash. Assuming that your client knew that, would that change the analysis as to whether they were, in fact, a willing participant in this transaction?

MR. MARKS: No. Because, your Honor, there's no question that DarkPulse knew what it was signing up for. They

had counsel for each of these notes. They were aware of this unregistered dealer issue. There's nothing unlawful about the transaction that's been entered into. And, again, this is just one of the several prongs of 29(b), the notion that DarkPulse needs to be an unwilling and innocent party. It would be different if they were coming at this for the first time, but there is nobody more sophisticated than DarkPulse about these convertible notes. They've done 20 of them. They've been converted to the tune of 3.5 billion shares. They've brought all sorts of lawsuits about them. They've hired here, and they've hired them several times, the law firm that represents all these small-cap companies in these cases.

So we believe that that element, that they would not have a reasonable likelihood of success on these several elements under 29(b), including this element.

Just to conclude, we don't think your Honor needs to even reach the likelihood of success on the merits of this injunction. We think, in the first instance, that this belongs in Delaware, where the preexisting case in chancellery court regarding this note is going forward.

But if we were to reach the merits, we think that it fails under irreparable harm as well as the likelihood of success on the merits.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Passanante, I'll give you an opportunity to respond briefly.

MR. PASSANANTE: Sure, your Honor. Thank you.

Just one thing I wanted to clarify that Mr. Marks said. When he was referring to the usurious nature of the contract and arguing that the reserve shares were not included in the calculations, he was absolutely correct.

What he's incorrect about were the shares that we're alleging that did count in the calculation, which were the 75 million commitment shares that were issued upon execution of the note. That was what was valued at \$1.4 million. The reserve shares are what the transfer agent holds in reserve. So the commitment shares is what Mr. Marks was supposed to be referring to, because those were issued upon execution of the note. The reserve shares that he was discussing have to do with an obligation under the notes that require the company to put shares in reserve. Those shares in reserve are held by the transfer agent, the trust account, which will then be transferred to the lender upon a request for a conversion.

Those shares are held in reserve to ensure that the lender can actually obtain shares upon conversion. So he's correct; they're not conveyed, and they should not be calculated at value; however, the 75 million shares that were conveyed upon execution should be considered value —

THE COURT: So did you include the reserve shares in your calculation in determining the usurious nature of the contract?

MR. PASSANANTE: Yes, your Honor. With the stated interest rate on top of the OID, that amounts to roughly 25 percent. The value of the stock that they acquired upon execution was roughly \$1.4 million.

THE COURT: Again, I'm just trying to get this one little point clear in my mind. Mr. Marks said that you included the reserve shares in your calculation, and my question to you is, did you?

MR. PASSANANTE: No, your Honor. So what we included was the commitment shares.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: The shares that were actually conveyed upon execution. Reserve shares were not conveyed upon execution. They were held, like I said, by the transfer agent.

THE COURT: You didn't include them in your calculation?

MR. PASSANANTE: No, your Honor. Because they didn't --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PASSANANTE: And that property under Sabella, which was decided in the Southern District, a case we mentioned in our papers, the value of those shares given as consideration are absolutely considered as interest. And regardless of how those shares are valued, because understandably, they were likely restricted, which would have probably at least a slight

reduction in value at the time of conveyance as to the market price, regardless even a fraction of a percent would take it under -- over the lawful interest rate, making the entire loan void *ab initio*.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: And with respect to Ader Bays, another clarification, what the Court said was --

THE COURT: With respect to what?

MR. PASSANANTE: Ader Bays, the Court of Appeals decision decided last fall.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PASSANANTE: That wasn't mentioned in our papers regarding at least the conversion discount to the applied interest, but if it were, there's certainly a way to value that conversion option.

As the Court in that case stated, as the Court of Appeals stated, there is a factually intensive analysis to determine the value of the conversion option at the time of execution. And it's specifically laid out two methods that it would suggest courts to engage in; either Black-Scholes analysis, the way that options and warrants are valued, or binomial lattice evaluation.

THE COURT: A binomial?

MR. PASSANANTE: Binomial lattice. Please don't ask me to explain it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PASSANANTE: But it's a valuation procedure that would occur at the -- by a financial expert that would consider obviously volatility, among other things, to determine how much that conversion option is valued. But I want to just state that that is not necessary here. Because of commitment shares, the stated interest and the original issue discount would easily take us past that 25 percent threshold.

And, your Honor, as to the note being a security -- a note is defined as a security under the Exchange Act. So there's really no argument to that effect, saying that it is not a security. And it is, indeed, also a loan, obviously, because it's money in exchange for a repayment of that debt whether it be by cash or -- sorry.

THE COURT: So if it is a security, is it subject to usury analysis?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, it's a loan as well, your

Honor. So a loan is subject to a usury analysis, but a note is
a security under the Exchange Act.

MR. BENZENBERG: Your Honor, if I may. The Exchange Act definition section when it defines security, it states stock, note, warrant, option, and lists several other types of financial instruments. Additionally, New York usury laws applies to any loan or forbearance of money. The note would constitute a forbearance of money, and in that regard,

must comply with New York usury laws.

MR. PASSANANTE: And just to speak to the effect of the defendant's reliance on the trader exemption, your Honor. It's important to point out that the defendants do not acquire shares on the open market like a trader would. They do not make money based on the appreciation of the stock that they acquire, because they make it based off of the markup from the conversions that they — that they are entitled to under the notes that they enter into. Traders do not do that. Traders engage in a few isolated transactions, and aren't acquiring securities with the view towards distributing those same securities.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't understand that last part. Can you go through that again?

MR. PASSANANTE: Yes. So the defendants argue that they fall into the trader exemption. The trader exemption is essentially for people like me or you who would engage in purchasing stocks with an e-trade account or some other kind of brokerage account. If me or you were to acquire those shares, we would acquire them and hope for them to increase in value, and then hope to make money on the gain of that profit. As opposed to an underwriter or a dealer, who acquires those securities with a view towards distribution. The reason they can act in that manner is because they acquire them at a discount to the market price.

THE COURT: So it's as if they have no interest in the value of the security going up?

MR. PASSANANTE: Well, I wouldn't say that they don't have any interest in the value of securities going up, but I would say that they do not need the value of the securities to go up because they'll always make money because they'll always be in the money based on the conversion discount. So they'll always acquire under market, whether it be a --

THE COURT: Well, it's under market today, right?

Isn't it always going to be to under market?

MR. PASSANANTE: Generally, yeah. They will draft the agreements to always be under market, whether it be with a fixed discount or with an adjustable discount. Even though it has a fixed discount, they'll usually have a default provision so they can convert a fraction of the stated fixed interest — fixed conversion rate.

THE COURT: But that doesn't mean that they would never have an interest in having them value the stock over market?

MR. PASSANANTE: Correct, yeah. And as to the unwilling or innocent party discussion, the fact that DarkPulse was simply a party to these transactions does not mean that they assisted in violations.

Like you brought up, they were an emerging growth company, they were desperate for capital, and simply by

engaging in these tractions does not by any means mean they were assisting in the violations that the unregistered securities dealers were.

And that would be all from me, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Marks, anything?

MR. MARKS: Just to correct one thing about the trader exception.

What Mr. Passanante was referring to when saying that we received these shares at a discount, okay, he's referring to a variable rate note that I described before, where there's a built in 30 percent discount off of the market. Here, there was a fixed rate at 15 cents, you know, 15 cents or .015 per share. Okay? There was market risk. Okay? That is not Ader Bays. That is not a riskless transaction where we're always going to be below the market when we convert. So that is not the sign of a dealer. That fits squarely within the trader exception.

Otherwise, I rest on my prior arguments and papers.

THE COURT: Very well. So let's take a 5-, 10-minutes break. Don't go far.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Okay. The injunction will not issue.

First, I find that defendants are correct that the forum selection clause is presumptively enforceable, and thus this action is not properly before this Court. The forum

selection clause is presumptively enforceable if: One, it was reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement; two, the clause is mandatory and not merely permissive; and three, covers the claims and parties involved in this suit.

Citing Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, the defendants have put forth evidence that the November 2021 amendment was communicated to DarkPulse's CEO, Mr. O'Leary, who signed it. DarkPulse cannot reasonably contest that the forum selection clause was communicated to it, because it was contained in the agreement signed by Mr. O'Leary, who, as CEO of the company, was sufficiently sophisticated to understand it.

Moreover, there's evidence in the record that he also had the advice of counsel at the time that he signed it.

Here, citing H.A.L. NY Holdings v. Guinan, reported at 2018 WL 5869648, a Southern District case from 2018. By its terms, the forum selection clause is mandatory and covers this action, and there's no evidence on the record before me that the enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, nor that the clause is invalid.

While that may be sufficient for the denial of the motion, I find that even if the forum selection clause did not apply, I would deny the motion for preliminary injunction. In deciding whether to enter a preliminary injunction, I must consider four factors: One, where the plaintiff is likely to

succeeds on the merits; two, whether they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; three, the balance of hardships, or equities; and four, whether an injunction is in the public interest, citing *Benihana*, *Inc.* v. *Benihana of Tokyo*, 784 F.3d 887 of 2015, Second Circuit case.

Plaintiffs has not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. In fact, plaintiff's theory that the April 2021 note is invalid under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act because FirstFire was acting as an unregistered broker dealer has already been rejected by two courts in this district. See LG Cap Funding, LLC v. ExeLED Holdings, reported at 2018 WL 6547160, a Southern District case from 2018, and EMA Financial, LLC v. Vystar Corp., reported at 2021 WL 1177801, a 2021 Southern District case, reconsideration denied. And that was reported at 2021 WL 5998411. The no broker-dealer representation clause in the April 2021 agreement also undercuts plaintiff's claims.

Furthermore, plaintiff has not established that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. All plaintiff argues at section 29(b) must not provide for damages, the only remedy is recision. Courts in this district have found that monetary damages are an adequate remedy for stock on the market. See, for example, Alpha Cap Anstalt v. Shiftpixy, reported at 432 F.Supp. 326 of 2020, Southern District case, and Union Capital, LLC v. Vape Holdings,

reported at 2017 WL 1406278 of 2017, Southern District case.

I find that the time period between FirstFire's conversion of the note and the initiation of this action further undercuts a finding of irreparable harm. In addition plaintiff placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that defendant was apparently reporting to dump, if you will, its remaining stock on the market. Nothing in the record in the history of the transactions between the relationships between these two parties suggests that will be the case.

As to the third and fourth factors, I do not find that plaintiff has demonstrated that the balance of hardship strongly favors it or that the public interest would be disserved by denial of the instant motion.

The record shows that FirstFire owns a very small percentage of DarkPulse stock, approximately 5 percent, and so it is unlikely that selling this stock could cause the reputational damage that DarkPulse fears. In fact, FirstFire has put forth the argument that it could be harmed if I enjoined it from selling the stock it converted pursuant to the note.

Finally, while the registration requirement under section 15(a) does serve public interest, I do not find that this necessarily applies to the parties' transactions, given the provisions of their contract, executed between two sophisticated entities who had previously entered into a

MIL6DARC 1 similar contract. 2 That constitutes the opinion of the Court. 3 How do the parties wish to proceed, Mr. Marks? 4 MR. MARKS: Well, your Honor, we have until 5 March 13th -- I'm sorry, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: You don't to have to apologize. 7 MR. MARKS: As far as proceeding goes, our response to the complaint is due, you know, like March 13th. We were just 8 9 served January 13th. I imagine we'll probably be filing a 10 three-page letter before your Honor pursuant to your rules 11 seeking leave to file a dispositive motion. 12 THE COURT: Very well. Anything further that I should 13 do today, Mr. Passanante? 14 MR. PASSANANTE: No, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Marks? MR. MARKS: No, thank you, your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: Then we're adjourned. I want to thank the parties for your arguments today. They were quite helpful. 18 19 (Adjourned) 20 21 22 23 24

25